Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC), which provides a set of security features to DNS, is a broad topic. In this article, we will briefly show DNSSEC validation happening on a bind9 DNS server, and then introduce the topic of how we can disable certain cryptographic algorithms from being used in this validation.
DNSSEC validation
Out of the box, the BIND 9 DNS server is configured to try to use DNSSEC whenever it’s available, doing all the validation checks automatically. This is done via the dnssec-validation setting in /etc/bind/named.conf.options:
options {
(...)
dnssec-validation auto;
(...)
};
This can be quickly checked with the help of dig. Right after you installed bind9, you can probe ask it about the isc.org domain:
$ dig @127.0.0.1 isc.org +dnssec +multiline
; <<>> DiG 9.18.12-0ubuntu0.22.04.1-Ubuntu <<>> @127.0.0.1 isc.org +dnssec +multiline
; (1 server found)
;; global options: +cmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 57669
;; flags: qr rd ra ad; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 2, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 1
;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
; EDNS: version: 0, flags: do; udp: 1232
; COOKIE: 71aa6b4e4ca6bb4b01000000643fee81edf0840b48d28d44 (good)
;; QUESTION SECTION:
;isc.org. IN A
;; ANSWER SECTION:
isc.org. 300 IN A 149.20.1.66
isc.org. 300 IN RRSIG A 13 2 300 (
20230510161711 20230410161439 27566 isc.org.
EUA5QPEjtVC0scPsvf1c/EIBKHRpS8ektiWiOqk6nb3t
JhJAt9uCr3e0KNAcc3WDU+wJzEvqDyJrlZoELqT/pQ== )
;; Query time: 740 msec
;; SERVER: 127.0.0.1#53(127.0.0.1) (UDP)
;; WHEN: Wed Apr 19 13:37:05 UTC 2023
;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 183
We can see that a RRSIG DNSSEC record was returned, but the key information in this output is the ad flag near the top. That stands for “authenticated data”, and means that the DNSSEC records in the response were validated.
To see an example where this verification fails, we can use the www.dnssec-failed.org domain, which is specially crafted for this:
$ dig @127.0.0.1 www.dnssec-failed.org +dnssec +multiline
; <<>> DiG 9.18.12-0ubuntu0.22.04.1-Ubuntu <<>> @127.0.0.1 www.dnssec-failed.org +dnssec +multiline
; (1 server found)
;; global options: +cmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: SERVFAIL, id: 56056
;; flags: qr rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 0, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 1
;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
; EDNS: version: 0, flags: do; udp: 1232
; COOKIE: 541f6c66a216acdb01000000643fef9ebb21307fee2ea0e3 (good)
;; QUESTION SECTION:
;www.dnssec-failed.org. IN A
;; Query time: 1156 msec
;; SERVER: 127.0.0.1#53(127.0.0.1) (UDP)
;; WHEN: Wed Apr 19 13:41:50 UTC 2023
;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 78
Here we see that:
- There is no
IN AIP address shown in the reply - The status is
SERVFAIL - There is no
adflag
In the bind9 logs, we will see DNSSEC validation errors:
$ journalctl -u named.service -n 10
Apr 19 13:41:50 j named[3018]: validating dnssec-failed.org/DNSKEY: no valid signature found (DS)
Apr 19 13:41:50 j named[3018]: no valid RRSIG resolving 'dnssec-failed.org/DNSKEY/IN': 68.87.76.228#53
Apr 19 13:41:50 j named[3018]: broken trust chain resolving 'www.dnssec-failed.org/A/IN': 68.87.85.132#53
(...)
We can run dig with the +cd command line parameter which disables this verification, but notice that still we don’t get the ad flag in the reply:
$ dig @127.0.0.1 www.dnssec-failed.org +dnssec +multiline +cd
; <<>> DiG 9.18.12-0ubuntu0.22.04.1-Ubuntu <<>> @127.0.0.1 www.dnssec-failed.org +dnssec +multiline +cd
; (1 server found)
;; global options: +cmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 42703
;; flags: qr rd ra cd; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 3, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 1
;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
; EDNS: version: 0, flags: do; udp: 1232
; COOKIE: 3d6a4f4ff0014bdc01000000643ff01c3229ed7d798c5f8d (good)
;; QUESTION SECTION:
;www.dnssec-failed.org. IN A
;; ANSWER SECTION:
www.dnssec-failed.org. 7031 IN A 68.87.109.242
www.dnssec-failed.org. 7031 IN A 69.252.193.191
www.dnssec-failed.org. 7074 IN RRSIG A 5 3 7200 (
20230505145108 20230418144608 44973 dnssec-failed.org.
R6/u+5Gv3rH93gO8uNvz3sb9ErQNuvFKu6W5rtUleXF/
vkqJXbNe8grMuiV6Y+CNEP6jRBu0jOBPncb5cXbfcmfo
CoVOjpsLySxt4D1EUl4yByWm2ZAdXRrk6A8SaldIdDv8
9t+FguTdQrZv9Si+afKrLyC7L/mltXMllq3stDI= )
;; Query time: 0 msec
;; SERVER: 127.0.0.1#53(127.0.0.1) (UDP)
;; WHEN: Wed Apr 19 13:43:56 UTC 2023
;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 287
Restricting DNSSEC algorithms
It’s possible to limit the cryptographic algorithms used by BIND to validate DNSSEC records. This is done via two configuration settings, located inside the options { } block of /etc/named/named.conf.options:
-
disable-algorithms "<domain>" { a; b; ... };
Disables the listed algorithms for the specified domain and all subdomains of it. -
disable-ds-digests "<domain>" { a; b; ... };
Disables the listed digital signature digests for the specified domain and all subdomains of it.
For example, the following disables RSAMD5, DSA and GOST for all zones:
disable-algorithms "." {
RSAMD5;
DSA;
};
disable-ds-digest "." {
GOST;
};
The list of algorithm names can be obtained at DNSSEC Algorithm Numbers, in the Mnemonic column of the Available Formats table. The algorithm number is also standardised, and is part of the DNSSEC records.
For example, if we go back to the dig result from before where we inspected the isc.org domain, the RRSIG record had this (showing just the first line for brevity):
isc.org. 300 IN RRSIG A 13 2 300 (
In that record, the number 13 is the algorithm number, and in this case it means the algorithm ECDSAP256SHA256 was used.
Just to see how BIND would react to an algorithm being disabled, let’s temporarily add ECDSAP256SHA256 to the list of disabled algorithms:
disable-algorithms "." {
RSAMD5;
DSA;
ECDSAP256SHA256;
};
And restart BIND:
sudo systemctl restart bind9.service
Now the ad flag is gone, meaning that this answer wasn’t validated:
$ dig @127.0.0.1 isc.org +dnssec +multiline
; <<>> DiG 9.18.1-1ubuntu1-Ubuntu <<>> @127.0.0.1 isc.org +dnssec +multiline
; (1 server found)
;; global options: +cmd
;; Got answer:
;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 43893
;; flags: qr rd ra; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 2, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 1
;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION:
; EDNS: version: 0, flags: do; udp: 1232
; COOKIE: 6527ce585598025d01000000643ff8fa02418ce38af13fa7 (good)
;; QUESTION SECTION:
;isc.org. IN A
;; ANSWER SECTION:
isc.org. 300 IN A 149.20.1.66
isc.org. 300 IN RRSIG A 13 2 300 (
20230510161711 20230410161439 27566 isc.org.
EUA5QPEjtVC0scPsvf1c/EIBKHRpS8ektiWiOqk6nb3t
JhJAt9uCr3e0KNAcc3WDU+wJzEvqDyJrlZoELqT/pQ== )
;; Query time: 292 msec
;; SERVER: 127.0.0.1#53(127.0.0.1) (UDP)
;; WHEN: Wed Apr 19 14:21:46 UTC 2023
;; MSG SIZE rcvd: 183
The logs only say there was no valid signature found:
Apr 19 14:23:01 j-bind9 named[2786]: validating isc.org/A: no valid signature found
Note this is different from rejecting the response: it just means that this response is being treated as if it didn’t have any DNSSEC components in it, or in other words, it’s treated as “insecure”.
In general, as always with cryptography, be careful with which algorithms you decide to disable and remove from DNSSEC validation, as such errors can be hard to diagnose. To help with troubleshooting, the Internet Systems Consortium (ISC) has published a very extensive DNSSEC guide, which contains a detailed troubleshooting section (see below).
Note:
Remember now to remove the disabling ofECDSAP256SHA256from/etc/bind/named.conf.optionsand restart BIND 9. This change was just a quick test!