Team Memberships
I am currently a member of the following teams:
- Canonical - Joined on 2024-10-01
- Canonical Security Team - Joined on 2024-10-01
- Ubuntu Security Apprentices - Joined on 2024-10-01
- Customer PPAs Security Team - Joined on 2025-01-20
Verified Identity
I am a member of ~canonical-security, my identity has been verified through a background check, in person, and during the onboarding process.
History of high-quality sponsored security updates
I have made multiple security updates for different packages, with their respective USNs. These are listed below:
- nano 7064-1 7064-2
- python-urllib3 python-pip 7084-1 7084-2
- waitress 7115-1
- curl 7104-1
- vim 7131-1 7220-1
- pygments 7128-1
- twisted 6988-2
- python-tornado 7150-1
- rabbitmq-server 7143-1
- recutils 7137-1
- shiro 7139-1 7147-1
- salt 7181-1
- libspring-java 7165-1
- phpunit 7171-1
- libvpx 7172-1
- ceph 7182-1
- golang-golang-x-net 7197-1
- pdns pdns-recursor 7203-1
- poppler 7213-1
- audacity 7211-1
- openjpeg2 7223-1
These updates have provided a diverse set of challenges. As an example, in the python-urllib3 update, a failing test was identified that was causing build failures from source on one of the Ubuntu releases (Launchpad bug number: 2084715), which was promptly fixed along with the USN.
One of the packages that proved to be challenging was vim, as the package had many code differences between releases, and the backports were not as straightforwards because of it as with other packages. There were also some tests that were failing both locally and when building on Launchpad, and therefore deep analysis had to be made as to whether those test failures were caused as a result of those backports, or if they were unrelated. Some of the tests ended up being skipped.
After thorough running and testing of the salt package after the backport fixes, an issue was identified with the package which made testing troublesome. This issue was consequently assigned a bug report (2091653) and subsequently released along with the USN.
All USNs also included previous research of the vulnerabilities and CVEs. In some cases, the CVE patches were not clearly identified (such as with shiro and recutils packages) which required investigation into which patches applied the fix for the respective CVEs.
Demonstrated understanding of required tools and systems
I have worked primarily with UCT by researching, identifying, and updating the tracker with the corresponding information from previous research and published USNs.
Some examples are:
- Merge into master : openjpeg : lp:~hlibk/ubuntu-cve-tracker : Git : Code : Ubuntu CVE Tracker
- Merge into master : openvpn : lp:~hlibk/ubuntu-cve-tracker : Git : Code : Ubuntu CVE Tracker
- https://code.launchpad.net/~hlibk/ubuntu-cve-tracker/+git/ubuntu-cve-tracker/+merge/479862
I have also implemented several QRT tests to test for potential regressions in packages. Some examples are:
- nano (https://code.launchpad.net/~hlibk/qa-regression-testing/+git/qa-regression-testing/+merge/474933)
- vim (Merge into master : test-vim : lp:~hlibk/qa-regression-testing : Git : Code : QA Regression Testing)
- twisted (Merge into master : test-twisted : lp:~hlibk/qa-regression-testing : Git : Code : QA Regression Testing)
Through the CVE patching process, I was also able to identify and make improvements to the existing security team scripts that are used for it, such as scripts in ubuntu-security-tools and ubuntu-qa-tools. Some examples of these are:
- Merge into master : add-legacy : lp:~hlibk/ubuntu-qa-tools : Git : Code : Tools used by the Ubuntu QA Team
- Merge into master : unembargo-warning : lp:~hlibk/ubuntu-qa-tools : Git : Code : Tools used by the Ubuntu QA Team
- https://code.launchpad.net/~hlibk/ubuntu-security-tools/+git/ubuntu-security-tools/+merge/479222
I have also made improvements to scripts in private repositories.
Continued, on-going security updates
As a member of the Security Engineering team, I will continue to work on security updates on a regular basis.
Demonstrated responsive and respectful communication
I have signed the code of conduct. I regularly monitor Launchpad bugs for packages I have patched, as well as relevant mailing list announcements, looking for possible regressions. I was only once inquired about a security update, which I responded to promptly by providing the needed information and resources about the respective CVEs.
Demonstrated understanding of the responsibility of ~ubuntu-security membership
I am following credentials best practices, my disk is fully encrypted, and have 2FA enabled for all accounts.